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RICHARD LEMPERT

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper might look very different had I been asked a sensible question.
Instead, I was told that the focus of the program for which this paper was
originally prepared was "Does law matter?" and that my particular assignment was to discuss the question of whether the criminal law mattered. Of
course criminal law matters. One hardly need be a committed functionalist to
conclude from the dense net of criminal laws that envelop modern societies
that criminal law must matter or else we would not have so much of it or,
conversely, because we have so much of it, it must matter. And if this abstract
exercise were not satisfying, one could go to any prison and ask the men or
women therein whether the criminal law mattered. They would tell you it
did; if it didn't they would not be forfeiting years of their lives. Moreover,
there is a long tradition of research on the deterrent and other preventive
functions of the criminal law (Lempert 1981-82; Gibbs 1975). The evidence,
ranging from Andenaes's ( 1966) anecdotal evidence of a crime wave during a
Montreal police strike to the most sophisticated modern quantitative research
(e.g., Loftin, McDowall, and Wiersma 1992) is that people's actions are
sometimes ordered at least in part by fear of criminal sanctions, and it may be
that other aspects of the criminal law, such as its presumed educative effects,
also affect behavior.
The situation is, to be sure, somewhat more complicated than this. Certainty of punishment appears far more important in ordering behavior than
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differences in the severity of the punishment that violators receive ( Gibbs
1975; Lempert 1981-82). Thus, what matters most is that some sort of
police force catch those who violate legal norms. The legally specified penalties
and those actually inflicted appear less important; and marginal differences in
penalty severity, such as the symbolically important difference between the
death penalty and life imprisonment, may not matter at all (Lempert 1981).
Indeed, it may not be fear of the law's penalty which mediates the criminal
law's impact. In many cases, particularly involving minor offenses, the implications for personal relations of being caught-including the anticipated
embarrassment-may account for most of law's impact. Thus, various researchers have reported that for minor crimes like shoplifting or smoking
marijuana, anticipated peer sanctions are more important than legal sanctions
as determinants of behavior (Anderson, Chiricos, and Waldo 1977; Burkett
and Jensen 1975; Saltzman, Waldo, and Paternoster 1983). Even in the case
of serious felonies which can result in long sentences, the law's efficacy may
depend more on the threat of breaking up relationships or destroying them
than it does on the actual apprehension of violators or the sentenc~s they
receive (Lieb, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1984). Moreover, deterrence is a
subjective phenomenon. Lon Fuller (1964), the eminent jurisprudent, was
more than philosophically right: a law that is not communicated is no law at
all. Indeed, how a law is communicated and the degree of threat inherent in
the communication may be more important in ordering behavior than the
law's specific content. Thus Ross (1982), who investigated crackdowns on
drunk driving throughout the world, consistently found marked deterrent
effects in the early days of highly publicized crackdowns, but, except in rare
instances, the effects did not endure the dissipation of publicity over time,
even when neither the law nor enforcement patterns reverted to their precrackdown patterns (Ross 1982).
These contingencies, while interesting in their own right, do not, however,
problematize the fundamental question of whether the criminal law matters.
The quick answer, "of course it matters," is still the most obvious and the
most obviously correct. Only John Griffiths 's ( 1979) tactic of separating law
from power and criminal law from its enforcement seems to problematize the
question. But power is not something that can be separated from law. As sociolegal theorists from Weber (1968) through Black (1976) have recognized,
power, which is to say the potential for enforcement, is built into law's very
definition.
So why was I asked to address the question, "Does (the criminal) law
matter?" Why wasn't the answer presupposed and the more sensible question
asked, "How does (the criminal) law matter?" The latter was the question
I would have to address in any event, but the former question started my
thinking. Contemplating it, I was reminded of a comic strip I had seen some
years ago. An older man is reflecting on love and marriage. In the strip's
first panel, he is recalling the innocence of a youth when, fueled by romantic
novels and Hollywood movies, he envisioned marriage as a state of continual
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love in which one lives happily ever after. In the second panel, he is recalling
his college and early postcollege years. Failed affairs rendered him cynical and
he came to believe that there was no such thing as enduring love and that
marriage was largely an institution of convenience. In the final panel, he is
reflecting on twenty years of married life and says oflove in marriage, "I had
no idea it was every other day."
Ifwe make our L-word not "love" but "law," and criminal law in particular,
we have here ( 1) a nice metaphor for the mattering of criminal law; and
(2) a reason why it was perhaps not so silly to ask the question "Does (the
criminal) law matter?" in the first instance. The metaphor is nice in two ways.
First, if we look to where we expect to see criminal law mattering, we do
not always see effects we associate with law. With respect to the criminal
law as a mechanism for ordering behavior, for example, most often when
we see behavior ordered in accordance with the criminal law's norms, we
give the criminal law's norms no weight whatsoever in explaining perceived
compliance. If people are not killing each other, it is not because criminal
law proscribes killing but because people know, totally apart from criminal
law, that killing is morally wrong and that killers are detested. In subgroups or
situations where this is not true, where, for example, killing is a way of proving
manhood, murder, despite criminal law, occurs with alarming frequency. Yet
occasionally, as is revealed in some of the deterrence studies previously cited,
law affects the behavior of enough people so that its measurable aggregate
impact is unmistakable. 1 Thus the effects of criminal law on social order
are not always obvious, but from time to time they appear. Second, as with
marriage and love, the relationship which allows law's effects to appear and
disappear continues. Without an enduring marriage, the love that our comic
strip character spoke of would not be felt every other day. Similarly, without
the ongoing applicability of criminal law and a continually viable enforcement
apparatus, the world would not occasionally appear ordered by the application
of criminal law.

2. LEGITIMACY
But now I wish to get away from compliance mechanisms like deterrence to
discuss other (and in my view more interesting) ways in which criminal law
has this "now you see it, now you don't" form of mattering. Criminal law is
symbolic. It not only symbolizes a society's abhorrence of certain behavior
(Durkheim 1984; Garland 1990), it also and perhaps more powerfully symbolizes the restraints that a society puts on itself and on the government that
is its agent in dealing coercively with its members. Indeed, when we speak
of the "rule of law," we largely have in mind criminal law and its associated
regulatory law, like rules of criminal procedure, that condition the application
of criminal sanctions. If criminal law is largely what we have in mind when we
speak of the "rule of law," criminal law must matter or at least must appear
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to matter, for if criminal law clearly did not matter, the rule of law could not
be a dominant motif in ideologies of capitalist democracies.
In ascribing this role to criminal law, I am following the lead of E. P.
Thompson (1975), Douglas Hay (1975), Isaac Balbus (1973), and others
(e.g., Genovese 1972) who have agreed that the idea of the rule of law,
as worked out through the visible play of the criminal justice system, is a
central feature in capitalist systems of domination. In their view, fairnessexemplified by occasions on which criminal law honors its own restraints to
free less powerful social actors from the threat of social sanctions or respects
its own norms in punitively sanctioning powerful social actors-is the central
mechanism by which criminal law legitimates an unequal social order.
Thus, Thompson describes the workings of the Black Acts-draconian
legislation which punished severely (often capitally) such seemingly small (to
modern eyes) violations of the forest order as poaching deer and breaking
fish dams. Some people were hung for these crimes; but others, known in
the country to be equally guilty, were acquitted because the law's rigorous
requirements for proof could not be surmounted. With known poachers
going free, even those most oppressed by the acts could not dismiss the legal
cloak for oppression as mere window dressing. Hay ( 1975) recounts the tale
of Lord Ferrers, a British nobleman hanged and then dissected like a common
criminal for murdering his steward. Not only was his hanging a contemporary
subject of story and song; his story was still being told in the countryside half
a century after the event. The story's inescapable conclusion is the lesson that
no one is above the law, but it seemed to have fascinated most not those who
might reasonably have aspired to be above the law but rather the classes who
would be subject to law in any event.
Isaac Balbus (1973) describes the fates of many black citizens arrested for
race rioting in the 1960s. Low bail was eventually set for most of them, and
many cases foundered for want of proof. Again, these are the kinds of outcomes that law formally demands; they are unexpected only to the extent that
when class interests are palpable one might expect the rule oflaw to give way.
This expectation, which accords most closely with an instrumental Marxist
worldview, is, however, naive. The point which each of the above authors in
his own way makes is that the interests of capitalists as a class are by and
large independent of the outcomes of any particular clash of capitalist and
noncapitalist or even anticapitalist interests. Capitalist systems of government
are more viable and their domination is more complete when the governed
are prone to accept the legitimacy of laws the elite has enacted than when
subordinate classes view capitalist law simply as an instrument of class warfare.
If legitimacy can be enhanced by hanging the occasional nobleman or not
hanging a known poacher, the collective interest of the capitalist class is
thereby advanced, not threatened.
One might, of course, argue that criminal law need not matter to achieve
these ends. All that is needed is for people to think the law is being applied fairly, and to achieve this end widespread false consciousness suffices.
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Theoretically, this is true, but the empirical examples belie the argument.
The law mattered to those Black Act violators who lived because the state
could not muster sufficient proof. It also mattered to Lord Ferrers who was
convicted because he had broken the law and was sentenced to death and
executed according to the law's strictures. He would not have believed that his
execution was mere appearance. More generally, if these arguments about the
connection between the rule oflaw and legitimacy are correct, I do not think
that there is any escape from the notion that criminal law as a set of punitive
norms and state constraints sometimes matters. The best and sometimes only
way to get people to think that law applies is to apply it.
People confronted with examples like those mentioned above are not
mistaken if they think law mattered in these instances: surely it did. Their
mistake, if they make one, is to think that the clear, visible appearance of
law's importance means that law always matters in the same way as it does
in its visible appearances. The fact that there are cases in which law matters
more than immediate instrumental class interests does not mean that powerful
interests cannot in large measure determine when law matters. The Black
Acts mattered not only when the law freed some accused but when the law
hanged, punished, or deterred others. Thus, both the punitive substantive
and restraining procedural aspects of the criminal law seemed to have served
class interests. Moreover, prosecutions and convictions under the Black Acts
were not uniform over time; rather there was an ebb and flow which may
have reflected the felt needs of dominant classes for the protections these laws
accorded their interests. This does not mean dominant classes necessarily turn
on and off the two sides of criminal law as if they were working a spigot; rather
a less than fully conscious sense of urgency may motivate the application of
law and the degree to which law matters.
Where the felt need for punitive measures is great, constraints that inhere in
proceeding through criminal law may not for a time matter. A good example of
this is the application oflaw in the riots that Balbus discusses. While the riots
were ongoing, rioters arrested were often not brought immediately before
judges as the law required; or if brought, there was no serious effort made
to determine whether charged felonies were really misdemeanors or whether
there was enough evidence to constitute probable cause to hold a person. Bail,
when it was set, was set far out of proportion to the charged crime. Some days
later, when the rioting had ended and it was becoming costly to hold those
arrested, proper forms were followed. Bail was set or alleged participants were
released on recognizance, felony charges were dropped, and the like.
Even more instructive is the "exception that proves the rule." Judge
George Crockett, Jr., a black Recorder's Court judge in Detroit, was almost
alone among judges hearing riot cases in Detroit in that he tried to make
law matter even while the riot was ongoing. Rioters brought to his court had
reasonable bail set based on the charges brought against them even ifit meant
releasing them to the streets before calm prevailed. For this he was excoriated
in the press as if he were acting illegally. In a sense, the press was not too far
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from the mark. Judge Crockett was not acting illegally, but he was not acting
role-responsibly if his role was to be a social control agent. Arguably, this is
a judge's most fundamental role; it is simply one that in democratic societies
is latent most of the time, for it ordinarily does not clash with the judge's
manifest role as an agent of the rule of law. But in the midst of a riot, the
roles can clash.
During the riot, Judge Crockett was a hero only in portions of the black
community and at some local law schools, segments of the community that
are atypical in the seriousness with which they are likely to take a judge's
rule-of-law role. When the riot was safely ended, praise for Crockett grew
and his performance during the riot eventually sent him to Congress where
he served for many years in the House of Representatives.
Those who continued to excoriate Judge Crockett for his role in the riots
were not acting in completely bad faith, even from a rule of law perspective.
They wanted to believe that when Crockett freed alleged rioters in the midst
of the riot there was some aspect of his manifest role responsibility-his
responsibility as an agent of the law-that he was violating. They could not
believe that a good faith interpretation of the law not only allowed him to act
as he had but in fact required it. The intuition that "there ought to be a law,"
an intuition that elevated the judge's social control responsibilities above his
legal duties, was a strong one. I still recall the Wayne County prosecutor, who
in the spring following the Detroit riots visited a seminar I was teaching on
riots. When he learned that Judge Crockett had participated a week earlier,
he tried to pump me for information about what Judge Crockett had said.
He was sure that there was evidence somewhere that the judge had acted in
bad faith or from illegal motives. And he assumed that I as a law professor
would share this view.
To recapitulate briefly, the criminal law in both its procedural restraining
and its substantive punitive aspects typically has an on-again/off-again quality.
In order to fulfill a legitimating function, the criminal law must sometimes
matter in the sense that the norms inherent in the law's rules are occasionally
applied, to the apparent frustration of a dominant class's interests. But the
criminal law need not always matter in this way to fill a legitimating function.
Indeed, law that matters too much is potentially counterproductive. Too
many instances of contravening the dominant class's interests could aggregate
to the point where their total cost to the dominant group outweighed the
benefits they brought. However, so long as the dominant group largely
controls the content of legal norms in the first place, this danger, even in
an avowedly liberal legal system, is unlikely to be great.
A second implication of this analysis is that criminal law matters in a
different, larger sense, whether or not it matters in the sense that its norms are
applied in individual cases. It matters because the on-again/off-again pattern
of mattering at the case level lends legitimacy to a system of domination at the
macrolevel. This is essentially the argument of the three authors I have focused
on most closely in this section. There is a problem with this implication,
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however. No one has ever proven that law matters in this larger sense.
Although the arguments of such scholars as Thompson, Hays, and Balbus
are plausible, and are additionally attractive in their ability to rescue us from a
simplistic, empirically untenable instrumental Marxism, there is no proof that
the rule of dominant classes is legitimated by the occasional legal victories of
the dominated or by instances in which those on top are criminally prosecuted.
And it is hard to see how this legitimation hypothesis could be rigorously
tested. Although contrary to the views of some skeptics (Hyde 1983), it
is clear that legal procedures can have legitimating functions (Thibaut and
Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1984). These functions, however,
operate at the case level and largely turn on procedures that allow parties
to feel that they have participated in legal decisions affecting them. To this
extent, the implementations of the procedural protections that the criminal
law grants the accused may affect how criminals regard their treatment by
the law (Casper 1972, 1978). The hypothesis that the criminal law matters
because it legitimates class domination through the support it renders the
rule-of-law ideology must, however, remain an hypothesis.

3. LAW'S INTERMITTENCY
The idea of the rule oflaw does not, of course, just apply at the macrolevel. The
processing of each case is supposed to be an occasion for the application of the
rule of law, but here too the criminal law sometimes matters and sometimes
does not. Let me give two mundane examples which illustrate the themes of
the appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of the rule of criminal law
in case processing and the tension between the need for social control and the
genuine pull that the rule of law ideology has on actors within the criminal
justice system.
Consider first the initial case in a string of narcotics cases. In this case,
the arresting officer, when pressed, admits that the only reason he searched
the defendant and found the heroin he uncovered is because the defendant
appeared to be a suspicious-looking person. The judge, applying the Mapp
exclusionary rule, suppresses the heroin as the fruit of an unreasonable search,
and the criminal goes free. Here the criminal law which proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures clearly matters. Without this norm, the accused
would no doubt have been convicted of drug possession.
The next case is similar, except that the officer testifies that he saw the
suspect reach into his pocket for a cigarette lighter and pull out not just
the lighter but a clear plastic packet containing white powder, which fell to
the ground. Since the powder looked like heroin, the officer picked it up
and arrested the accused. The judge finds that there was probable cause for
arrest; she denies the motion to suppress, and the accused is convicted of drug
possession. Again the criminal law appears to have mattered. In this instance,
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the requisites of a reasonable search and seizure were met; and in accordance
with the law, the evidence was allowed.
The case, however, has the surprising consequence of spawning a generation ofclumsy criminals. In hundreds ofcases that follow, police officers testify
that they made arrests for drug possession after they saw suspects accidentally
drop packets containing illicit drugs like heroin, marijuana, cocaine. Such
testimony becomes so common that cases of this type are given a name: the
"dropsy" cases. In each case, motions to suppress the evidence are made. In
each case, the motions are denied on the ground that an officer who sees a
suspicious pack drop to the ground acts reasonably when she picks it up and,
if it looks as if it contains drugs, has probable cause to seize it and to make an
arrest. Now it appears that criminal law as a set of authoritative legal norms
does not matter, for surely most of these officers are lying.
In fact, the situation is more complex and illustrates the many ways in
which criminal law can matter, for whether or not it matters depends on
whose perspective one takes. From the defendant's point of view, law does
not matter because he is being convicted despite the law's norms and his
actual behavior. From the judge's point of view, law does matter, because had
she heard a different story, such as the suspicious appearance story in our
first example, she would have suppressed the evidence. Experienced judges,
to be sure, will be suspicious of dropsy cases. But what should a judge do?
One judge put it something like this, "I have heard enough dropsy stories
that I am suspicious. But what am I to do? In any given case a police officer's
testimony appears more credible than that of a self-interested defendant. " 2
From the police officer's view, the story is mixed, for two criminal law
norms are involved. The first, the criminal proscription of perjury, appears
not to matter at all, for to make good pinches officers are willing to lie with
abandon. However, search and seizure law does matter-not in the way that
it should, which is channeling an officer's behavior on the streets, but in
channeling behavior in court, which is to say in specifying the content of an
efficacious lie. As Weber ([1922] 1978) long ago pointed out, the lawbreaker
who operates by stealth is just as surely orienting himself to the demands of
the criminal law as the person who refrains from tempting behavior because
it is illegal. Each is acting differently than he would if the law's norms were
different.
Finally, to continue with this example, dropsy cases are sufficiently publicized, get such a bad name, and threaten to give the law such a bad name
that crucial actors decide they have had enough. In one New York case the
New York County District Attorney even urged the state's highest court to
overturn dropsy seizures by shifting the burden of persuasion on the issue. 3
Other judges also express skepticism of dropsy testimony, and its incidence
seems to diminish. Indeed, in one instance long after the great concern over
dropsy testimony had dissipated, a police officer was actually indicted for
telling a dropsy story from the stand (Gellman 1988). Again criminal law
matters. Although dropsy testimony has not disappeared and some of it may
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have been replaced by different, more acceptable lies, to some extent law
mattered.
Both the complexity and the on/off nature of how criminal law matters
are also nicely illustrated when we consider trials. In criminal cases, a steady
but small source of reversals is due to error in instructing the jury. Considering the incidence of errors at trial, reversals for erroneous instructions are
proportionately more common than reversals for violating procedural rules
of evidence because instructions often state the law as it applies to cases, and
it is stretching things to hold such errors harmless. 4 When courts do reverse
for instruction errors, it is easy to see that criminal law, as enunciated in
instructions, matters.
However, research consistently reveals that jurors have great difficulty in
comprehending instructions, sometimes performing at no better than chance
levels (Charrow and Charrow 1979; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington 1983;
Ellsworth 1989; Reifman, Gusick, and Ellsworth 1992). 5 Thus, it would
seem that criminal law as enunciated in instructions hardly matters, for if
jurors do not understand the instructions, how can instructions influence their
decisions? An implication is that when appellate courts reverse for errors in
instructions, thus making law matter, they are likely to be reversing for reasons
that wouldn't have mattered had the jury heard the law stated correctly in
the first instance.
The puzzle here is that jurors often appear to decide cases correctly ( Kalven
and Zeisel 1966; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington 1983). How can they do
this if the law as given to them by the court does not matter? 6 The obvious
explanation is that their folk norms of what constitutes particular crimes
largely coincide with the law's formal definitions, and it is folk norms rather
than legal norms that matter. But where do the jurors' popular conceptions
of what constitutes particular crimes come from? They may in some measure
come from the criminal law's norms as conveyed to jurors through various
media. At the same time, the law's norms in many areas reflect popular
conceptions of what constitutes specific crimes. Thus, when jurors judge
criminals, the law's norms probably matter whether or not the jurors fully
understand their instructions. At the same time, the law's norms may in large
measure ( depending on the crime) define behavior that jurors would have
regarded as conviction-worthy regardless of the law. Thus, law matters; but
so do popular views, and one cannot separate out their effects on each other.
To add a further wrinkle, there is another way in which instructions that
state the law can matter. It appears that jurors late in their deliberations often
have instructions reread as an aid in breaking deadlocks. The tactic may work
because it gives one or two dissenting jurors a face-saving way to withdraw
from a minority position. They can claim that although they continue to
subscribe to the factual story they have been advocating, they realize that
for technical legal reasons even their factual portrait does not mandate their
verdict preference. Here the law matters simply because it exists. Indeed, a
hard-to-understand instruction may be more helpful in this respect than a
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clear one because dissenting jurors can read into the instruction whatever
is needed to justify their switch to the majority. Alternatively jurors may
understand or misunderstand an instruction as reread, and may use their new
sense of understanding to break their deadlock. Whether legal norms matter
in this situation depends on whether they have been correctly understood.

4. LAW AS RESOURCE
The argument thus far is that criminal law matters, sometimes in unexpected
ways, both at the macro (societal) level and at the micro (case) level. At
each level, however, criminal law norms or their potential availability do not
determine occasions of mattering. Rather, criminal law has what I have called
a "now you see it/now you don't" or "on-again/off-again" character. In
one situation, where the law's norms lead one to expect it will matter, it does;
but in another situation where there is the same normative expectation that
the law will matter, it does not. In the remainder of the chapter, I will offer a
general explanation for this phenomenon, as I illustrate the law's intermittent
mattering in other settings.
The criminal law (indeed all law) matters in some settings where it is
supposed to matter and not in others because it is a resource. At one time, I
thought that to speak this way was to speak metaphorically-that the law was
not really a resource but was simply like one. But upon further reflection I
think that to call law a resource is to speak precisely. It is a source of support
that people may draw on in the same way they draw on other resources
in their environment such as savings accounts, accumulated human capital,
and the availability of others to help them achieve their goals. Law may be
an intangible resource, as when one invokes the law's authority to order
another's behavior, or a tangible one, as when one calls the police to achieve
the same end.
In one sense, however, criminal law is a special resource. Its norms specify
when it is to be deployed. 7 But criminal law is not self-deploying. People must
do this. More than occasionally, particularly in more formal legal settings,
people draw on law as a resource in the way law "intends." People are arrested
because they have violated the law; they are charged with crimes their behavior
best fits, and the rights that criminal procedure grants to the accused are
honored throughout the guilt-determining process. More often, however,
people treat law as they would any other resource available to them. Legal
norms do not determine law's activation. Rather people draw on law when it
is handy, convenient, and cheaper than alternative means to particular goals.
Even when law is invoked as its norms specify it should be, the invocation is
less likely to reflect respect for the law's norms than the sense that invoking
those norms precisely is a cheap way to achieve an actor's interests.
This helps explain the law's on-again/off-again quality. The law's norms
specify a wide area where it should be deployed (i.e., where it should matter).
236

A Resource Theory of the Criminal Law

But people generally invoke law-which is to say, make it matter-only when
invocation is an efficacious route to their ends. So often when it appears law
might or even should matter, it does not, for its authority is not needed.
Conversely, the law's authority may be invoked in situations where its own
norms appear to preclude this. This occurs because law can limit its own
authority only when those who are responsible for enforcing law respect those
limits. This does not always happen. Ironically, those specially responsible for
enforcing law are often in the best position to avoid its limits.

5. INDIVIDUAL USE
Whether law is handier, cheaper and more convenient than alternative ways
to achieve particular ends depends not just on what the law as a set of rules
is, but also, and usually more importantly, on how law can be mobilized; that
is, on those institutional arrangements that allow people to invoke the law.
Two examples, drawn from the literature on policing, illustrate this point.
First, consider policing of skid rows. As both Bittner ( 1967) and Spradley
( 1970) emphasize, skid row policing is not so much about law enforcement as
it is about order maintenance or peacekeeping. Indeed, Bittner's motivation
to look at skid row was his interest in how police functioned as peacekeepers.
He believed skid row would provide him with the purest example of maintaining order without law, but he found this could not be done. His conclusion
in this respect is worth quoting:
Though our interest was focused initially on those police procedures that did
not involve invoking the law, we found that the two cannot be separated. The
reason for the connection is not given in the circumstance that the roles of
the "law officer" and of the "peace officer" are enacted by the same person
and thus are contiguous. According to our observations, patrolmen do not act
alternatively as one or the other, with certain actions being determined by the
intended objective of keeping the peace and others being determined by the
duty to enforce the law. Instead, we have found that peace keeping occasionally
acquires the external aspects oflaw enforcement. (Bittner 1967: 714, emphasis in
original)

The police it seems are almost totally confused-or perhaps it is better to
say "fused"-with the law they enforce. The skid row situation reminds one
of the classic Western movie scene in which a stranger in town taps an old
timer on the shoulder and asks him, "Is there any law in this burgh?" The
old timer points to the marshal and replies, "Yep, you're looking at him." If
the same question were asked of a skid row denizen, he would answer "yes"
and point to the policeman. Indeed, most people would find the linkage a
natural one.
Phenomenologically, the connection between law and enforcer cannot
be disputed, but one may nonetheless ask whether the link is conceptually
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justified. From the legal perspective, it is not. The criminal law distinguishes
between its norms and those that enforce them. Indeed, as we have already
noted, there is a special subset of criminal law norms-rules of criminal
procedure-that is intended to control the behavior of the criminal law's
enforcers.
From a sociological perspective, the situation is more interesting. Whether
the fusion of law and enforcer is conceptually justified depends on how law
is defined. Black's (1976) definition of law as governmental social control
suggests that if there is any divergence between the law's norms and the
actions of governmental control agents, it is the latter rather than the former
which defines the law. More classic definitions oflaw, like Weber's (1978) or
Llewellyn and Hoebel's (1941), have two ingredients: a set of authoritative
norms and an enforcement staff. The assumption is that the latter will act in
conformity with the former. But this only sometimes happens. For example,
on skid row the criminal law is sometimes appropriately enforced in full
conformity with its norms, as when a drunk is arrested for his drunken
behavior. On other occasions, the law's requirements for enforcement are
fully met, but the invocation of the law is pretextual. Thus, Bittner describes
a situation in which, in order to break up a group and forestall the possibility
of a fight, one of four equally drunk men was arrested while the others were
simply sent on their way. On still other occasions, legal norms are largely
irrelevant. Thus, a person who has been drinking but is not drunk may be
arrested on a drunkenness charge when his real "crime" is cursing the police
officer or, as in another ofBittner's examples, the paddy wagon is handy, and
it is more efficient to arrest the drinker at the time than to wait until he is
actually drunk and send again for the paddy wagon.
From the point of view of the arrestee, what matters is the police officer's
action rather than the norms that also figure in law's definition. 8 But is it law
that is mattering to an arrestee when an officer acts? Where the officer's actions
and·legal norms are congruent, it is easy to conclude that it is law that matters.
Where, however, the law is a pretext for action, the question of whether law
matters has no simple answer, even conceptually. To the extent law is a set
of rules, law appears not to matter since legal norms are not being correctly
applied; but to the extent that law consists of the actions of an authorized
enforcement staff, law matters, for actors with a generalized legal authority
to act are so acting, even if the specific reasons they invoke are inapposite.
Thus, it is law which allows police to make arrests, even if law in a narrower,
rule-reverential sense does not authorize it. One might say in these situations
that law matters, but that the law is not working as intended. Yet even this
conclusion is risky because it assumes the intent behind law is obvious from the
language of a law's provisions. In applying drunkenness or vagrancy statutes
to people who are not actually drunk or legally vagrant, the police officer
may nevertheless be using the law for precisely the peacekeeping purposes
the law's drafters intended (cf. Wilson and Kelling 1982). Indeed, such laws
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often only vaguely define forbidden behavior in order to provide police, and
through them society, with generalized order maintenance resources.
In some situations where police conduct differs from the commands of
law, there is a clear sense in which criminal law does not matter because police
action does not simply fail to conform with the literal requisites oflegal norms;
it positively violates them. Examples include police who solicit bribes to tear
up traffic tickets or who charge those they have beaten with resisting arrest in
order to provide cover stories for their abuse. But in another sense, the law
matters here as well. It is the police officer's privileged position with respect
to legal resources that allows the officer to transform criminal law, a public
resource, into an instrument for private benefit. In exploiting these resources
for personal gain, the officer is acting much like the office worker who copies
her tax return on an office xerox machine. The difference between the two is
the easy access to resources that their institutional positions allow. The office
worker is fortuitously situated with respect to a xerox machine, while a police
officer is fortuitously situated with respect to the law.
In most circumstances, of course, the police are not violating the law. Most
of the time, the criminal law in its normative sense matters to the police,
and so it matters to us as well. Motorists who have not been speeding are
seldom stopped for speeding, and those given speeding tickets usually have
been traveling at least five miles per hour over the speed limit. Miranda
warnings are real and given, and the "third degree" has largely disappeared
from the repertoire of police interrogation techniques. Arrested drug dealers
have typically been dealing drugs, arrested murderers are usually likely to
have killed or are legitimately suspected of doing so, and so on. In short, the
police typically use the public resource that is law for public ends and invoke
the criminal law in ways consistent with the law's norms. Their major failing,
ifit is a failing, is that they do not invoke the law in many situations where the
law apparently intends its own invocation. Thus the criminal law often does
not matter the way it should, or it does not matter at all because of limited
institutional capacities for enforcement. Some legal scholars ( Goldstein 1960)
have been quite troubled by this, while other, more sociologically oriented
students of the police (Skolnick 1975) see underenforcement as inherent in
the nature of police work.
Criminal law is, of course, a resource not just for the police but for all of
us. Anyone can "call the cops," and many people do. Indeed, the police are
a resource apart from the law, for many calls to the police seek aid, such as
help in transporting a sick person to the hospital, that the caller knows is not
part of the police's law enforcement mission (Wilson 1968). Even where the
police are called because the law has been broken, there is a tendency among
both police and citizens to privatize the public resource that is law. Black
(1971), for example, found in his study of the social organization of arrest,
that complainants' preferences were a major factor in determining whether
an alleged lawbreaker was arrested. The other two major factors predicting
arrest in Black's study were whether the offense complained about was a felony
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(arrest more likely) or a misdemeanor and whether the suspect in the field was
disrespectful (arrest more likely) or not. We have thus, in one study, a nice
illustration of the three ways that criminal law as a resource is most commonly
employed. First, it is employed by police for the public end of crime control.
Second, it is employed by police as a private resource to revenge affronts. And
third, it is employed by complainants as a private resource to control others'
behavior.
Returning our attention to the last of these uses, that is to the use of
criminal law as a resource for citizens, one can ask how effective it is in
this respect. This depends on both legal and institutional considerations.
Sometimes laws that citizens wish to draw on do not exist. Thus, until
recently most states did not have legislation that prevented "stalking." Police
receiving complaints of stalking often purported to be helpless. The best
they could offer terrorized victims was "ifhe attacks call us," which was, no
doubt, of small solace. Ultimately, stalking incidents culminating in beatings
or homicides persuaded legislatures to pass laws making stalking itself a crime.
These laws provide a new resource for both citizens and police.
Passing a law, however, is not enough to provide citizens with a viable
resource. Legal resources are of limited value to citizens unless they can
mobilize law. With respect to criminal law, this most often means mobilizing
the police-which can be problematic. Indeed, members of the same minority
groups that disproportionately feel victimized by police exploitation of the
criminal law for police ends ( such as enforcing respect) also disproportionately
feel victimized by their inability to exploit the law for their own ends. The
police, they complain, often show up late when they call, or fail to respond
at all (Hacker 1992; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).
Merely mobilizing police, however, is not enough to privatize law as a
resource, for there is no guarantee police will respect a complainant's private
preferences. Consider the situation of a woman who has called the police
because her husband has struck her. Once police are on the scene, they have
many options. They may ignore a caller's request for leniency and reaffirm
the public nature of the law; as when the police, following department policy,
arrest an abuser that the complainant wants only to be warned. Alternatively,
once the police are on the scene they may appropriate the law to their own
ends, as when they ignore a complainant's preferences and arrest a man
because he has been disrespectful toward them. In other situations, both
public and private claims to the use of law are denied as when police refuse
to arrest an abuser despite the complainant's preference. Another police
response devalues the legal resource by giving a caller less enforcement than
the law provides, as when an abuser is only separated from a spouse who
wants him arrested. Finally, police may follow a complainant's preferences,
privatizing the legal resource in a way which may or may not conflict with the
public's interest in how law is deployed. Only the last of these options allows
those who mobilize the police to fully privatize the law as resource. In each
of these circumstances, except where nothing is done, criminal law clearly
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matters, but it matters for different ends. And even where nothing is done,
law matters in a more limited sense, for it provided the excuse that brought
police to the scene, and the event that precipitated the call is at least likely to
have been transformed (Sherman and Berk 1984).
I have chosen the police to illustrate how criminal law can be used as
a resource and to show how the same cost-benefit considerations that mean
that any resource will be used only intermittently depending on circumstances
apply to the use of the criminal law. Thus, it is not surprising that the scope of
criminal law's mattering is not defined by criminal law's self-proclaimed scope
of applicability, but instead turns on the contexts in which it might be applied
and on alternative means to achieve goals within these contexts. The same
point could have been made in the context of other institutional sectors.
Totalitarian regimes, for example, need not free offenders whose actions
challenge state interests on legal technicalities because the overwhelming
force at their disposal means that they need not depend on legal legitimacy to
maintain order. In some regimes at some times it is, in other words, less costly
to rely on mechanisms like secret police than on law. Public defenders and
prosecutors need not agree on pleas which comply precisely with the law a
defendant has violated. Subject to certain constraints, they may use the array
oflaws as a resource for fitting a punishment to the degree of crime (Sudnow
1965; Maynard 1984). Judges can ignore penalties that law puts at their
disposal when they feel that lectures or other "situational sanctions" will have
an adequate punitive and deterrent effect (Mileski 1971; Wheeler et al. 1968;
Merry 1990). Prison officials can turn much of the social control of prisons
over to the inmates, and prison guards can prefer "tune ups" to formal legal
proceedings when prisoners have behaved improperly (Sykes 1958; Jacobs
1977; Marquart and Couch 1985).

6. GROUP USE
The examples I have used to develop this resource theory are instances where
individuals seek to privatize the ostensibly public criminal law. Groups may do
the same thing with both the criminal and civil law. The classic example from
the civil law is the interest group which secures a special subsidy or tax benefit,
but this is just one way in which groups promote laws, including criminal laws,
that turn portions of the wealth or power of the state into group rather than
public ends. Less obvious is that the state itself and entities within the state
are often such interest groups. Calavita (1992), for example, describes the
Bracero program which, in allowing the temporary importation of Mexican
farm workers, seems to have been ideally designed to provide growers in
the South and West with cheap labor. Yet she tells us the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) originally had to sell the program to skeptical
farmers. They persuaded farmers that the Bracero program would solve their
labor problems because the program was even better designed to solve the
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INS's core problem, keeping control of the Mexican-United States border.
While parts of the program were refined or adjusted so that it better served
farmers' needs, in those rare instances when dashes arose between farmers'
interests and the INS's interests, the INS often had sufficient strength to
adjust its policies for its own bureaucratic ends.
Groups may also use the law in conflict with other groups. In the first
portion of this paper we noted how law may be an instrument of domination
in that its restrained use can help legitimate regimes, which is ordinarily a
cheaper way of maintaining superiority than force of arms. Piven and Cloward
(1993) show that from the sixteenth century on, laws implementing poor
relief have been used by the state or dominant groups within it both as devices
to regulate labor markets and as "pressure release valves" that serve to contain
potential revolts from below in the hardest of times. Thus, early in Franklin
Roosevelt's first term, when the threat of social upheaval was greatest, there
was strong general support for direct relief. As recovery proceeded and the
threat of revolt receded, the consensus broke down and the welfare system
became increasingly suffused with elements of labor market control (e.g.,
benefit cutoffs in rural areas when the spring planting season commenced).
It may be no coincidence that today, with competition from low-cost foreign
workers rising, welfare "as we know it" has ended and been replaced by a
system designed to force welfare recipients to work without guaranteeing
that jobs paying enough to replace lost welfare income will be available.
Even before the sixteenth century, vagrancy laws were used to assure a
steady supply of cheap labor in the English countryside by prohibiting workers
in times of labor shortage (e.g., after the black death had decimated the
countryside) from leaving their native villages to sell their labor to those who
would pay the most (Chambliss 1964; Piven and Cloward 1993). Monsma
(1990; 1992) has documented an attempt to use vagrancy law for the same
purposes in colonial Argentina. When there were no labor shortages, enforcement of such laws was lax because labor could be secured more cheaply
through ordinary labor market activity.
Perhaps the most interesting use of the law as a group resource is a twist
on the legitimation function I describe early in this chapter. Rather than use
the law to legitimate its own rule, a group may use the law to legitimate its
own values, often by delegitimizing the values of some group with which it
is in conflict. Gusfield (1963) provides a good example of this in his book
Symbolic Crusade, which calls attention to the Protestant, nativist elements of
the prohibition movement and the extent to which the movement was fueled
by a desire to distinguish native Protestant American from immigrant Catholic
(especially Irish) cultures and to establish the moral security of the former. The
goal of establishing cultural superiority seems to be a similarly strong motivating force for activists on both sides of the abortion controversy (Luker 1984).
When law is used this way, it seems to be chosen because there is no easier
way of securing social validation for the morality a group asserts. Indeed, such

242

A Resource Theory of the Criminal Law

movements often take to politics and seek legal change only after voluntary
efforts at "converting the heathen" have failed. Unlike the situation where
law is used to legitimate a group's domination of the state, groups that seek
to legitimate a moral position seldom are in full control of the state, although
they may be more powerful than those whom they seek to morally dominate,
and they may be able to secure powerful allies who see acquiescence in the
group's morality as a small price to pay for support that can further cement
their own rule.
Groups that sponsor symbolic crusades are, however, seldom part of a
ruling class. Moral status groups often cut across lines of social power, and
it may be a lack of real power that motivates group members to demonstrate their moral superiority. Moreover, going to law for these purposes
presupposes a strong state or a willingness to fight, for it makes ruling
over the less dominant group more rather than less difficult. It also seems
to presuppose state authorities more powerful than either group, because
part of the motivation for seeking laws of this sort is to secure the state's
imprimatur on what would otherwise be a contestable moral claim. Thus, as
the prohibition movement advanced, whether a politician drank on the sly
seemed less important than whether he supported the proposed Eighteenth
Amendment, and anti-abortion activists hold no grudge against those who
have had abortions so long as they support the movement.

7. CONCLUSION
Whereas I was reminded of a comic strip at the start of this chapter, I am
reminded of a W. S. Gilbert lyric at its conclusion. In the operetta Ruddigore,
at the conclusion of one of Gilbert's finest patter songs, the characters sing:
This particularly rapid, unintelligible patter
Isn't generally heard, and ifit is it doesn't matter!

If the patter songs were not generally heard, there would be no sense in
writing them; nor would there be a point to the quoted lines, if hearing them
did not matter. But as Gilbert well knew, his patter songs were showstoppers.
They were the standout features of the most popular Gilbert and Sullivan
operettas and made for the few memorable moments in the less popular ones.9
Gilbert could mock them because they mattered so much. So I think it is with
criminal law. If we expect law to matter as it is enunciated, we can spot many
situations in which it does not matter. We can even spot situations where
apparently applicable criminal law does not matter by any standards. But
ultimately the question, "Does the law matter?" is worth asking not because
the law's mattering is problematic, but because it matters in so many ways
that we are well advised to sort them out. I have begun that task in this paper.
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NOTES
This paper was originally prepared for the Law and Society Association's 1993 Summer
Institute for Sociolegal Studies. I would like to thank Paul Hunt for his research assistance
and Gail Ristow for preparing the manuscript and tracking down numerous citations. I am
grateful to Howard Kimeldorf, Debra Livingston, and Jennifer Whiting for their comments
on an earlier version of this manuscript.
1. Even when the parallel between law and morality is as close as it is in the case of murder,
we cannot be certain that some of the compliance we attribute to morality is not, in fact,
a result of the law's threat (Andenaes 1966; Stephen 1883).

2. I have no citation for this quote-I read something like this once, but I no longer
remember where. The reader will have to accept my claim that at least in gist it is accurate.
For a similar sentiment expressed by a former district attorney, see Heilbroner (1990).
3. People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y. 2d 3rd, 279 N.E. 2d 709,321 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1971).
4. Courts often do so, however, by looking at the instructions as a whole. In fact, the
Supreme Court permits harmless error analysis even when instructions are constitutionally
flawed. There are some limits however. Recently the court held that an erroneous
instruction on the meaning of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof could
never be harmless error. Sullivan v. Louisiana; 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
5. From a rhetorical standpoint, instructions are often written in prose that even the college
educated have great difficulty understanding. I have long speculated that one reason that
may contribute to this is that marginally correct, difficult to understand instructions are
most likely to be appealed. Appellate courts faced, as they usually are, with criminals who
appear factually guilty strain not to overrurn merited convictions and approve dubious
instructions. These instructions, bearing an appellate court's stamp of approval and widely
disseminated through appellate opinions, then become safe instructions. Judges know
they have been approved and that they will not get reversed for using them. I have,
however, no way of testing this hypothesis; the most I can say is that it seems plausible
tome.
6. I am now assuming an extreme situation which probably only characterizes a minority
of instructions. Even if some or most jurors do not understand difficult instructions,
those who do can sometimes educate their fellow jurors in what these instructions mean.
The empirical research, however, does not give one great confidence in such educational
efforts (Ellsworth 1989; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington 1983).
7. In this, criminal law differs from much civil law. Civil law provides norms that may be
deployed but does not specify that they should be simply because occasions for their
application exist (Lempert 1972).
8. The latter may come to matter as the arrestee is further processed.
9. E.g., "My name is John Wellington Wells" in The Sorcerer.
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